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Torts-THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY Is ALIVE AND
WELL- Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.
2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, invoked as a complete de-
fense in tort actions against the state and its subdivisions, was
broadly waived by the Florida Legislature in 1975.1 Although the
waiver of sovereign immunity statute appears to render the state
at least partially liable for negligent action,2 the Florida Supreme
Court has recently held that governmental actions which are dis-
cretionary, i.e., carried out at the "planning" rather than the "op-
erational" level of government, are not subject to liability in tort.3
In Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County,4 the Third
District Court of Appeal was presented with a wrongful death ac-
tion naming Indian River County and the Florida Department of
Transportation (DOT) as third party defendants. The third party
complaint of Commercial Carrier and its liability insurer alleged
that the county and DOT were negligent in failing to maintain
stop signals at the fatal intersection.' The court relied on prior de-
cisions to hold that such negligent maintenance on the part of a
governmental authority is not actionable.6
In Cheney v. Dade County,7 the plaintiffs alleged negligence on
1. "In accordance with § 13, Art. X, State Constitution, the state, for itself and for its
agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immunity for liability for torts, but only to
the extent specified in this act .... " Ch. 73-313, § 1, 1973 Fla. Laws 711 (effective Jan. 1,
1975) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (1979)).
2. The statute provides:
The state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be liable for tort claims in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circum-
stances, but liability shall not include punitive damages or interest for the period
prior to judgment, Neither the state nor its agencies or subdivisions shall be liable
to pay a claim or a judgment by any one person which exceeds the sum of $50,000
or any claim or judgment, or portions thereof, which, when totaled with all other
claims or judgments paid by the state or its agencies or subdivisions arising out of
the same incident or occurrence, exceeds the sum of $100,000. However, a judg-
ment or judgments may be claimed and rendered in excess of these amounts and
may be settled and paid pursuant to this act up to $50,000 or $100,000, as the case
may be, and that portion of the judgment that exceeds these amounts may be
reported to the Legislature, but may be paid in part or in whole only by further
act of the Legislature.
FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1979).
3. Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1022 (Fla. 1979).
4. 342 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), rev'd and remanded, 371 So. 2d 1010
(Fla. 1979).
5. 342 So. 2d at 1048.
6. Id. at 1049.
7. 353 So. 2d 623, 624 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), rev'd and remanded, 371 So. 2d 1010
(Fla. 1979).
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the part of Dade County for failure to properly maintain a traffic
light. The third district again found no liability, holding that since
the duty was one owed to the public and not to a particular indi-
vidual, governmental immunity was not waived."
On writ of certiorari to the Florida Supreme Court, Commercial
Carrier and Cheney were consolidated.9 Respondents in both cases
argued that the waiver of immunity in section 768.28, Florida Stat-
utes'0 did not reach governmental acts such as negligent mainte-
nance." Respondents also argued that because liability under the
statute was coextensive with private liability and since "private
persons" did not govern, immunity was not waived for such purely
governmental functions as road maintenance. Therefore, respon-
dents asserted, the statute was merely a codification of the com-
mon law theory of municipal sovereign immunity.' 2
These two cases raise the issue of whether the differentiation be-
tween governmental and proprietary functions remains useful in
the wake of section 768.28. In the past, sovereign immunity applied
to all state activity and extended to all state agencies and coun-
ties."3 A waiver of immunity occurred only when the state agency
purchased liability insurance and then only up to the extent of pol-
icy coverage and only for certain activities. 14 Municipalities, on the
other hand, did not enjoy absolute immunity from tort liability.
Their immunity was limited to those activities considered "govern-
mental" as opposed to those considered "proprietary.' 5 Proprie-
8. Id. at 626.
9. 371 So. 2d at 1012.
10. (1979).
11. 371 So. 2d at 1013.
12. Id. at 1014.
13. See, e.g., Davis v. Watson, 318 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Buck v.
McLean, 115 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1959). In Davis, plaintiff alleged negligence
on the part of the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission for a gunshot wound inflicted
by an officer. The court held that the Commission had no power to waive its immunity to
suit. 318 So. 2d at 170. In Buck, suit was brought against the County Board of Public In-
struction for negligently permitting a screen between a baseball field and a grandstand to
deteriorate. The plaintiff had been struck in the eye when a foul ball penetrated the screen.
115 So. 2d at 765. The court found the school board to be an agency of the state and thus
absolutely and unqualifiedly immune from suit. Id.
14. Davis v. Watson, 318 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975). See FLA. STAT. §
286.28(1) (1979), which authorizes political subdivisions to secure liability insurance.
15. See Gordon v. City of West Palm Beach, 321 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
Suit was brought by the father of a motorcyclist killed in a collision at an intersection. The
court found the city to be immune from suit for failing to install and maintain traffic control
devices, which the court characterized as governmental functions, but liable for the proprie-
tary function of designing, constructing, and maintaining the streets and for failure to warn
of known hazardous conditions. Id. at 80. See also Woods v. City of Palatka, 63 So. 2d 636
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tary functions were those defined as promoting the public "com-
fort, convenience, safety and happiness." 6 Governmental functions
were those which promoted the public "welfare."' 7
A judicial attempt was made to discard the governmental-pro-
prietary dichotomy and to impose liability for the nondiscretionary
negligent actions of municipalities,' 8 but another distinction soon
appeared. In Modlin v. City of Miami Beach 9 the supreme court
reinstated municipal immunity for governmental functions to the
extent that the duty owed was to the public generally. Only when a
duty was owed to a particular individual or when its activity was
"proprietary" was the municipality liable for tortious breach of
duty.
In Commercial Carrier, the supreme court rejected the distinc-
tion between governmental and proprietary functions.2 0 But if
these familiar municipal distinctions were not applicable, did any
governmental action remain immune from liability under section
768.28? The court first looked to the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), the language of which the Florida statute tracked.2 ' The
court adopted federal constructions of the FTCA insofar as they
rejected the governmental-proprietary distinction and the associ-
ated "private persons do not govern" argument.2 2
Petitioners argued that since the FTCA explicitly exempted dis-
(Fla. 1953) (repairing defects in sidewalk is a proprietary rather than governmental func-
tion); Kaufman v. City of Tallahassee, 94 So. 697 (Fla. 1922) (maintenance of fire truck is a
proprietary function).
16. City of Lakeland v. State, 197 So. 470, 472 (Fla. 1940).
17. Id.
18. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957). The court stated:
[T]he law is not static. The great body of our laws is the product of progressive
thinking which attunes traditional concepts to the needs and demands of changing
times. The modern city is in substantial measure a large business institution ...
To continue to endow this type of organization with sovereign divinity appears to
us to predicate the law of the Twentieth Century upon an Eighteenth Century
anachronism. Judicial consistency loses its virtue when it is degraded by the vice
of injustice.
Id. at 133.
19. 201 So. 2d 70, 75 (Fla. 1970).
20. 371 So. 2d at 1016.
21. Id. at 1016 n.9. The federal act provides: "[Tihe district courts ... shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States . . . caused by the negli-
gent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government . . . under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable .... " 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b) (1976). The act goes on to provide that, "The United States shall be liable . . . in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances
... " Id. at § 2674.
22. 371 So. 2d at 1016-17.
380 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:377
cretionary acts from the waiver of immunity and the Florida act
did not, the legislature intended liability to attach even to discre-
tionary acts.2 3 The supreme court, however, was not willing to ab-
rogate sovereign immunity entirely. The court analyzed the deci-
sions of courts in other states which have waiver of sovereign
immunity statutes. The Florida Supreme Court found that other
state courts had read limitations into such statutes, reserving im-
munity for discretionary government activity.2
In the face of a constitutional provision which grants power to
waive immunity to the legislature, 2 and a concomitant legislative
enactment exercising that power, on what grounds can the judici-
ary read a broad discretionary limitation into the statute? The
Commercial Carrier court did so on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers. Constitutional theory provides the funda-
mental rationale of Commercial Carrier: "[C]ertain functions of
coordinate branches of government may not be subjected to scru-
tiny by judge or jury as to the wisdom of their performance."26 The
court claimed to abstain from the temptation to attach semantic
labels, 27 but then proceeded "[in order to identify" these func-
tions to invoke distinctions between "planning level" and "opera-
tional level" functioning of government.2 8
To determine what is a discretionary, "planning level" function,
the court adopted the criteria articulated in Evangelical United
Brethren Church v. State, 9 a 1965 Washington case:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily
involve a basic governmental policy, program, or objective? (2) Is
the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realiza-
tion or accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as
opposed to one which would not change the course or direction of
the policy, program, or objective? (3) Does the act, omission, or
decision require the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment,
and expertise on the part of the governmental agency involved?
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite
constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or
make the challenged act, omission, or decision? If these prelimi-
23. 371 So. 2d at 1017.
24. Id.
25. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13.
26. 371 So. 2d at 1022.
27. Id. at 1020.
28. Id. at 1022.
29. 407 P.2d 440 (Wash. 1965).
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nary questions can be clearly and unequivocally answered in the
affirmative, then the challenged act, omission, or decision can,
with a reasonable degree of assurance, be classified as a discre-
tionary governmental process and nontortious, regardless of its
unwisdom. If, however, one or more of the questions call for or
suggest a negative answer, then further inquiry may well become
necessary, depending upon the facts and circumstances
involved. 0
Thus, in the wake of Commercial Carrier, courts construing sec-
tion 768.28 must be able to identify policy decisions: those deci-
sions which involve a conscious balancing of risks and advantages.
Only in the performance of quasi-legislative functions does the
separation of powers doctrine prevent a court from judging the
propriety of a decision of a coordinate branch of government and
from imposing liability for alleged tortious wrongs.
Since Commercial Carrier, the Third District Court of Appeal in
Ferla v. Metropolitan Dade County," decided that the design of a
median strip was "operational" and that the setting of a speed
limit was "planning." What is distressing is the court's conclusion
that lane-width decisions were planning activities because massive
expense would be required to alter the lane width.2 The notion
that an activity which might otherwise be characterized as opera-
tional becomes a planning activity when it involves appropriation
of funds was embraced only by the dissent in Commercial
Carrier."3
The ruling of the Second District Court of Appeal in Ellmer v.
St. Petersburg,34 is not dissimilar. The court construed the test of
Commercial Carrier to mean that failure to warn of riot conditions
was a planning level activity and hence immune.3 " The court also
stated that it found "comfort" in a similar holding involving simi-
lar facts in Iowa, and in other Florida decisions holding that a mu-
nicipality is not liable for failure to supply police protection." In
Weston v. State,37 the court sanctioned the defense of sovereign
30. 371 So. 2d at 1019 (quoting Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 407 P.2d
440, 445 (Wash. 1965)).
31. 374 So. 2d 64, 66-67 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
32. Id. at 68.
33. 371 So. 2d at 1024 (Overton, J., dissenting).
34. 378 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
35. Id. at 827.
36. Id.
37. 373 So. 2d 701, 702 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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immunity when a state attorney was sued for malicious prosecu-
tion. This court, unlike the Ferla and Ellmer courts, responded af-
firmatively to each of the four inquiries of the Washington test
adopted by Commercial Carrier.3 8 It found that the decision to
seek an indictment involved the weighing of risks and advantages
and hence constituted a planning level activity.3 9
The Commercial Carrier court held that the maintenance of
traffic signals and signs did not represent discretionary policymak-
ing or planning activity and remanded the consolidated cases to
the district court with directions to remand to the trial court.40
Due to the supreme court's interpretation of section 768.28 in the
Commercial Carrier case, it is evident that the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity is still alive in Florida, at least with regard to "dis-
cretionary" governmental actions giving rise to tort claims.
S. STOCKWELL STOUTAMIRE
38. Id. at 703.
39. Id.
40. 371 So. 2d at 1022-23.
